Compare and contrast the strategic theories of Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz A comparative study by Dr GRAHAM BLICK
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Preamble
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are considered to be two of the finest exponents on the art of war ever to put pen to paper. In the research that has been undertaken an attempt has been made to examine the means employed by each in the pursuit of their aims and to make a comparative analysis of these means. The indirect approach adopted by Sun Tzu involves the use of subtle, flexible tactics designed to wear down the enemy, while gaining time to develop the capacity to defeat him in orthodox battle or to subject him to political or military pressures designed to cause him to seek peace. This is contrasted by Clausewitz’s direct approach to war, where mass armies clash “head-on” in open and bloody battle; where the underlying rationale is to completely dominate and destroy the enemy’s forces and thereby gain a decisive victory. In both strategies there are embodied political, social, economic, and psychological factors.
In addition two twentieth century practitioners of Sun Tzu’s ideas have been examined - Mao Tse Tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap has used both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz in the development of his strategy which is considered to be a synthesis of both Sun Tzu’s indirect and Clausewitz’s direct warfare. Giap has demonstrated his genius in Vietnam as did Mao in China.
Introduction
In his foreword in Samuel B. Griffith’s book Sun Tzu - The Art of War, B H Liddell Hart cites Sun Tzu’s essays on “The Art of War” as some of the earliest known treatises on the subject. He goes on further to state that they have never been surpassed in comprehensiveness and depth of understanding. They might well be termed the concentrated essence of wisdom on the conduct of war. Among all the military thinkers of the past, only Clausewitz is comparable, and even he is more “dated” than Sun Tzu, and in part antiquated, although he was writing more than two thousand years later. Liddell Hart says that Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more profound insights, and eternal freshness.(1)
Liddell Hart states that Civilisation might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world wars of this century if the influence of Clausewitz’s exposition on war, which moulded European military thought in the era preceding the First World War, had been blended with and balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu’s treatises on “The Art of War”. Sun- Tzu’s realism and moderation form a contrast to Clausewitz’s tendency to emphasise the logical ideal aid “the absolute”, which his disciples caught on to in developing the theory and practice of “total war” beyond all bounds of sense. That fatal development was fostered by Clausewitz’s dictum that “To introduce into the philosophy of war a principle of moderation would be an absurdity - war is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds.” Yet subsequently he qualified this assertion by the admission that “the political object, as the original motive of the war, should be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made.” Moreover, his eventual conclusion was that to pursue the logical extreme entailed that the means would lose all relation to the end.(2)
According to Liddell Hart the ill-effects of Clausewitz’s teaching arose largely from his disciples too shallow and too extreme interpretation of it, overlooking his qualifying clauses, but he lent himself to such misinterpretation by expounding his theory in a way too abstract and involved for concrete-minded soldiers to follow the course of his argument, which often turned back from the direction which it seemed to be taking. Impressed but bemused, they clutched at his vivid leading phrases and missed the underlying trend of his thought - which did not differ so much from Sun Tzu’s conclusions as it appeared to do on the surface.(3)
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The clarity of Sun Tzu’s thought could have corrected the obscurity of Clausewitz’s. Unfortunately, Sun Tzu, was only introduced to the West, by a French missionary’s summary translation, shortly before the French Revolution, and although it appealed to the rational trend of eighteenth century thinking about war its promise of influence was swamped by the emotional surge of the Revolution and the subsequent intoxicating effect of Napoleonic victories over conventional opponents and their too formalised tactics. Clausewitz began his thinking under the influence of that intoxication, and died before he could complete the revision of his work, so that this lay open to the ’endless misconceptions’ he had foreseen in his testamentary note. By the time later translations of Sun Tzu were produced in the West, the military world was under the sway of the Clausewitz extremists, and the voice of the Chinese sage had little echo. No soldiers or statesman heeded his warning: “there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.(4)
Clausewitz was always concerned to link theory to action, and he deliberately ignored all aspects of his subject that were not of immediate relevance to the conduct of the kind of war with which he himself was familiar.(5) The conduct of war, he wrote, has nothing to do with making guns and powder out of coal, sulphur, saltpeter, copper and tin; its given quantities are weapons that are for use and their effectiveness. Strategy uses maps without worrying about trigonometrical surveys; it does not enquire how a country should be organised and a people trained and ruled in order to produce the best military results. It takes these matters as it finds them in the European community of nations (6)….
Carl Von Clausewitz
Clausewitz has given us ten statements on War. These statements give us respectively his initial (“one level”) and his final (“three-level”) definitions of war.
“War is an act of violence intended to compel our Opponent to fulfil our will.”
“In its ‘element’ or essence, war is nothing but an extended dual, e.g. between two wrestlers in which each tries to throw his adversary and thus render him incapable of further resistance.”
“As the use of physical violence by no means excludes the use of intelligence, it comes about that whoever uses force unsparingly finds that he has the advantage over him who uses it with less vigour.”
Hence, as each side in war tries to dominate the other, there arises a reciprocal action which must escalate to an extreme.
For this reason:
“The disarming or destruction of the enemy….or the threat of this… must always be the aim in warfare”.
Thus Clausewitz, introducing his idea of Absolute War.(7)
Moving on to the second group of statements we have:
“War is a political act... also an effective political instrument, a continuation of political commerce and a carrying out of this by other means.”
“Under no circumstances is war to be considered as an independent thing... Policy is interwoven with the whole action of war and must exercise a continuous influence upon it…”
“Wars must differ in character according to the motives and circumstances from which they proceed.”
“The first and greatest and most decisive act of the statesman or general is to understand the kind of war in which he is engaging, and not to take it for something else, or to wish it was something else which, in the nature of the case, it cannot possibly be.”
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10. “War... is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, of the play of probabilities and chance which make it a free activity of the soul, and of its subordinate nature as a political instrument, in which respect it belongs to the province of Reason…” Thus Clausewitz, introducing his idea of Real War, or of War conceived as a Political Instrument.(8)
All commentators are agreed that Clausewitz’s greatest difficulty was to explain the relationship between these two ’ideas of war’; and almost all commentators have assured that his logical apparatus was adequate to the task of showing whether our two groups of statements are as contradictory or at least as contrary, as they appear to be, or whether perhaps they are in some sense complementary, or stand in some relation of subordination one to another.(9)
Clausewitz’s “direct” approach to war lies in stark contrast to the “indirect approach of Sun Tzu. He had learnt from Napoleon that” ...the universal currency of politics is power, and power resides “in the ability to wreak physical destruction”.(10) War," he writes, is an “... act of force and there was no logical limit to the application of that force”.(11) Thus the principal objective in war is “To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy". (12)
In direct contrast to the teachings of Sun Tzu to “avoid strength and strike weakness”, Clausewitz argues that “...we should always direct our principal operation against the main body of the army...”.(13) This was a similar approach to that undertaken by Napoleon i.e. exploiting weakness. The strategy might be different but the tactics were similar.
To make the result “perfectly plain”, power has to be concentrated where the chief blows are to be delivered — even, if it means incurring disadvantages elsewhere.(14)
All successes, he maintains, have to be followed up with the utmost energy, for “...only pursuit of the beaten enemy gives up the fruits of victory”. (15) As for Sun Tzu, speed is the essence of victory; by not wasting time, Clausewitz writes “... a hundred enemy measures are nipped in the bud...”. (16)
For Clausewitz, the gaining of public opinion - one of the main objectives of warfare(17) - can only come from victory. For Sun Tzu, public opinion or, as he termed it, national unity, was a very necessary pre-requisite to victory.
Clausewitz places little store in guerrilla warfare - the jewel in Sun Tzu’s crown. He scorns the notion that inflicting minor damage on the enemy’s forces will lead to their downfall and constitute a significant shortcut to victory.(18) Guerrilla warfare, he argues, can realistically be considered only “...within the framework of a war conducted by the regular army, and coordinated in one all-encompassing plan”.(19) For the flanking manoeuvres so gainfully employed by Sun Tzu, he has even less time: “...the principle of concentrating our forces as much as possible on the main point, he writes, “diverts us from the idea of strategic envelopment…”(20) of the enemy’s forces. Only under the strictness of conditions might an attack against an enemy’s supply base prove to be a tenable flanking manoeuvre.(21)
As for Sun Tzu, war for Clausewitz has a dual nature. Whereas Sun Tzu conceives of both armed and unarmed victory, for Clausewitz the essence of war is fighting, and its duality is expressed in the concepts of absolute and limited warfare.(22) Whilst the destruction of the enemy’s forces is the primary objective of war, political objectives might require the waging of “...minimal wars, which consist in merely threatening the enemy, with negotiations held in reserve”.(23) “Possible engagements” he writes, “are to be regarded as real ones because of their consequences”.(24)
Almost as a softener to his “bent” for destruction, Clausewitz contends, as does Sun Tzu, that the destruction that really matters is not physical but moral - “... the destruction of the enemy’s capacity to resist, the killing of his courage rather than his men”.(25) As Howard suggests, however, the space he devoted to, and the passion with which he wrote about the battle, and the stress laid on the Schlacht - slaughter, “suggest that he regarded a campaign
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that culminated in such an encounter as somehow morally superior to one that did not, that bloodless victory was for eunuchs”.(26) He believed that the ideal was total war — an ideal rarely realised. Thus most outcomes were unsatisfactory.
Whereas Sun Tzu strives for a detailed knowledge of his enemy and plans his strategy to suit, Clausewitz holds that everything in war is uncertain. It is impossible, he insists, to gauge the enemy’s intentions and reactions. Thus, at best, one can only work on probabilities and there will always be a substantial element of sheer luck.(27)
Sun Tzu
The master conquerer, writes Sun Tzu, conquers his enemy without engaging him in battle: “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill ”.(28) “The most important thing in warfare is to attack the enemy’s strategy:(29) frustrate his plans; break-up his alliances; create cleavages between sovereign and minister, superiors and inferiors, commanders and subordinates. By these means, the enemy becomes isolated and demoralised. Spies are employed to gather information, sow dissension, and nurture subversion. In short, the successful commander breaks his enemy’s will to resist, captures his cities without assaulting them, and overthrows his state without protracted operations.(30)
Armed force is to be used only as a last resort; only when victory has to be gained and the above means have failed. But there are conditions. First, victory has to be gained in the shortest possible time: “Victory”, writes Sun Tzu, “is the aim of war, not lengthy operations”.(31) Second, it has to be gained at the least possible cost in lives and effort: protracted wars - from which no country has ever benefited - serve only to increase the burden on the treasury, the troops, and the people.(32) Third, victory has to be gained with the infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties.(33) In other words, war is not about the annihilation of the enemy’s army, the destruction of his cities, and the despoliation of his countryside.(34)
“War”, writes Sun Tzu, “is a matter of vital importance to the State... It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”(35) The decision to wage war must be based on an objective assessment of relative strengths: on an assessment that takes into account not only the number and calibre of troops at one’s disposal, but the degree of national unity, the weather and terrain, the personal qualities of generals, and logistics.(36)
Only when the aggregation of these factors appear to be in his favour, does - the successful conqueror take up the cudgels.
For Sun Tzu, the art of waging war has a number of critical elements. The first is psychological: “All warfare”, he writes, “is based on deception.”(37) An indispensable preliminary to battle is to attack the mind of the enemy. Thus, for example, when you are “...capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. Then near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near, When he concentrates, prepare against him; when he is strong, avoid him.”(38) A primary target is the mind of the opposing commander: “anger... and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under strain and wear him down. Then he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you”.(39) In short, the victorious situation is very much the product of a creative imagination.
The second element requires a detailed knowledge of both yourself and your enemy: “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never fail”.(40) Thus, you must know even the names of the enemy’s army commander and staff officers, of the ushers and gate keepers of his cities, and of the body guards of the people you wish to assassinate.(41)
Of the men employed by the enemy, you must know whether they are wise or stupid, clever or clumsy.(42) Only by having an intimate knowledge of his people, his plans, his strengths and weaknesses, will you be able to determine the most successful strategy.(43)
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The third essential element of waging war is that of adaptability: “An army,” says Sun Tzu, “may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strengths and strikes weakness.”(44) Thus, tactics have to be adjusted to take best advantage of the enemy situation, of relative strengths, of lines of communication, of terrain, and of the situation of the people. Particular objectives may have to be sacrificed in order to acquire more valued objectives.(45) The same tactics, writes Sun Tzu, are never used twice, and thus the enemy is prevented from knowing “my shape”.(46) Perhaps the strategy that best demonstrates Sun Tzu’s flexible and indirect approach to war, is his use of the mutually compatible and interchangeable normal, or cheng, forces and extraordinary, or ch’i forces. The enemy engaged by the cheng (orthodox) force, was defeated by the ch’i (unorthodox, unique, rare, wonderful) force or forces; the normal pattern was a holding or fixing effort by the cheng while ch’i groups attacked the deep flanks and rear. Distraction assumed great importance and the enemy’s communications became a primary target.
The fourth element of a successful strategy embodies the elements of speed, surprise and mobility: “Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes end strike him where he has no precautions.”(47)
Finally, the expert commander strikes only when the situation assures victory, only when the experts have created the appropriate conditions. Thus “…he conquers an enemy already defeated.(48)
Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung
Mao Tse-Tung has been strongly influenced by Sun Tzu’s thought. This is apparent in his works which deal with military strategy and tactics and is particularly evident in Oil GUERRILLA WARFARE, ON THE PROTRACTED WAR, and STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF CHINA’S REVOLUTIONARY ’WAR. Some years before Mao took his writing brush in hand in Yenan, Red commanders had applied Sun Tzu’s precepts to their operations in Kiangsi and Fukien, where between 1930 and 1934 the inflicted repeated defeats on Chiang K’aishek’s Nationalists whose object it was to exterminate the Communists.(49)
Mao was most interested in the romances of old China and especially stories of rebellions. Among others, he read and reread the .CHUI HU CHAN (translated by Pearl Buck as All Men Are Brothers) and SAN KUO (translated by Brewith Taylor as Romance of the Three Kingdoms) and was greatly influenced by them. The San Kuo recounts battles, stratagems, and deceptions of such famous Three Kingdoms figures as Chu-Ko Liang, Ts’ao Ts’ao, Lu Sun, Ssu-Ma I, and Liu Pei, each of whom was a lifelong student of Sun Tzu’s classic. From these stories Mao absorbed much of the military love of his country.(50)
Whilst attending the Hunan Provincial Normal School in Ch’ang-Sha, Mao studied the works of most important political thinkers. However, it was the history of his country that he most concentrated on. The T’aip’ing rebellion (1851-64) has always been one of Mao’s favourites and Li Hsiu-Ch’en, the most competent leader the rebels produced, was one of his early heroes. Li, a studious man, had a remarkable flair for command. He and other T’api’ing generals were well versed in the ancient military writers, whose precepts they turned to good account. The rebel commanders always selected and advanced to the spot where the resistance was the weakest. They knew how to avoid or by-pass a strong defence and to assault a weak spot.... They knew how to make a detour in order to attack the rear or flank of the enemy’s position and how to confuse the enemy by attacking at one point to divert his attention while actually advancing on another.... They knew how to spy on their enemies and the activities of their fifth columnists usually preceded a formal military operation.(51)
From the T’aip’ings Mao also inherited ideas which were later reflected in his agrarian policies as well as in the rules of behavior. He incorporated 52 into the “Ten Commandments” of the Red Army.(52)
Mao apparently observed that Sun Tzu’s precepts are readily adaptable to the conduct of war of either the hot or cold variety, and although it was to be many years before he had the opportunity to apply them in the cold war against foreign “imperialists”, he had not long to wait for a chance to use them with startling effect against Chiang K’ai-shek in a hot one.(53)
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After the Nanch’ang uprising in August 1927 and the two battles with the Nationalists in 1928, Mao and Chu Teh began to mould an army. Both insisted that the Peasant volunteers be treated with decency and justice. Physical brutality was outlawed, as were the discriminatory practices and favouritism which chronically plagued the Manchu, Republican, and Kuomintang military establishments. Both Mao and Chu Teh (who took command of the army at this time) realized the need for a literate and well-indoctrinated force. This concern with morale, traceable in part at least to Sun Tzu’s teachings, was to pay handsome dividends, for it was the major factor which preserved the Red Army after the disastrous reverses suffered in Hunan in August and early September 1930.(54)
In 1933 after his fifth campaign and his defeat at the hands of the Nationalists Mao lost the initiative, and the Communists had to withdraw from Kiangsi. This campaign forced the Red command to undertake the now celebrated Long March to north-west China. Loss of initiative in the Fifth Campaign was in part due to overconfidence; the Red high command committed the cardinal sin of underestimating the enemy. Here for the first time, the Reds knew neither the enemy nor themselves, and were in peril in every battle. Possibly with this experience in mind, Mao later wrote: “We must not belittle the saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the great military expert of ancient China, ‘Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster’.”(55)
Kiangsi and the “Long March” were the Communists’ military laboratories; Yenan, the quiet retreat in which experience was analysed. Mao devoted little time to analysis of successes; study of the failures was more rewarding. With disarming honesty he described the last of the ‘Bandit Suppression’ campaigns as a Red “fiasco” in which the Communists had neglected to observe the principle which should govern all military operations: "The first essential of military operations is to preserve one’s own forces and. annihilate the enemy and to attain this end it is necessary to.., avoid all passive and inflexible methods….”(56)
The question of the offence as opposed to passive defence did not worry Mao; he realised, as Sun Tsu had, that no war can be won by adoption of a static attitude. Mao describes those who deliberately assume such a position as “fools”.(57)
The strategy and tactics used with such success against the Japanese emphasized constant movement and were based on four slogans coined at Ching Kang Shan:
“When the enemy advances, we retreat”!
“Then the enemy halts, we harass”!
“Then the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack”!
“Then the enemy retreats, we pursue”!
Mao has never felt it necessary to point out the remarkable similarity of his sixteen-character jingle to several of Sun Tzu’s verses.(58)
Later, when Mao was able to reflect on his experiences he wrote, in paraphrased elaboration of Sun Tzu: “In general, the shifting of forces should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west, appearing now in the south now in the north, hit-and-run and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice and confuse the enemy.
Flexibility in dispersion, in concentration and in shifting is the concrete manifestation of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas inflexibility and sluggishness will inevitably land one in a passive position and incur unnecessary losses. But a commander proves himself wise not by understanding how important the flexible employment of forces is but by being able to disperse, concentrate or shift his forces in time according to specific circumstances. This wisdom in foreseeing changes and right timing is not easy to acquire except for those who study with a receptive mind and think things over. In order that flexibility may not become reckless action, a careful consideration of the circumstances is necessary.”(59)
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Communist Commanders repeatedly proved themselves capable of utilising terrain more effectively than their opponents - they were experts at running away to live and fight another day. Mao acknowledged this and indicated that running away was usually designed to draw the enemy on and to induce overconfidence in his commanders who became arrogant and lax. Sucked into unknown country deprived of information, and with tenuous lines of communication, Nationalists were skilfully isolated and dealt with individually.(60)
The superior intelligence service of the Communists usually enabled them to determine the enemy’s “shape”; their own they were equally successful in obscuring. Their appraisals of the enemy were almost/invariably accurate.
One of the most difficult problems which confronts any commander who has committed his forces in accordance with a well-developed plan is to alter this in the light of changing circumstances. Sun Tzu recognised the inherent difficulties both intellectual and physical, and repeatedly emphasised that the nature of war is ceaseless change. For this reason operations require continuous review and readjustment. Mao writes, “The process of knowing the situation goes on not only before but also after the formulation of a military plan. The carrying out of a plan, from its very beginning to the conclusion of an operation, is another process of knowing the situation, i.e., the process of putting it into practice.(61)
To retire when conditions indicate it to be desireable is correct; attack and defence are complementary. Mao paraphrases Sun Tzu this way: “Attack may be changed into defence and defence into attack; advance may be turned into retreat and retreat into advance; containing forces may” be turned into assault forces and assault forces into containing forces.”(62)
Deception and surprise are two key principles. Again paraphrasing Sun Tzu, Mao has said that war demands deception. “It is often possible by adopting all kinds of measures of deception to drive the enemy into the plight of making erroneous judgements and taking erroneous actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and initiative. The enemy is deceived by creating ‘shapes’ (Sun Tzu) or ‘illusions’ (Mao)”. At the same time, one conceals his shape from the enemy. The eyes and ears of hostile commanders are sealed. Deception is not enough - the enemy’s leaders must be confused; if possible, driven insane. The morale of the enemy is the target of high priority, its reduction an essential preliminary to the armed clash. Here again is a distinct echo of Sun Tzu, the first proponent of psychological warfare.(63)
From Mao’s work, man emerges as the decisive factor in war. Weapons are important but not decisive. It is man’s directing intelligence which counts most: “In actual life we cannot ask for an invincible general; there have been few such generals since ancient times.We ask for a general who is both brave and wise, who usually wins battles in the course of a war — a general who combines wisdom with courage.”(64)
The wise general is circumspect; he prefers to succeed by strategy. This ability is what Sun Tzu had in mind when he used the phrase “to control victory”. In the early phases of the Civil War the Communists repeatedly demonstrated their mastery of deceptive tactics and their mobility and continually threw Sun Tzu’s book of war at their opponents. Examples of where these deceptive tactics were used are the maceration of the Nationalists in Manchuria-led by Gimo and later on the deployment of a quarter of a million men to battle positions south of the Yalu, Korea, before the United Nations command became aware that its widely dispersed 65 elements were even seriously threatened.(65)
As can be seen Mao Tse Tung had been strongly influenced by Sun Tzu's thought and used a lot of Sun Tzu’s military strategy and tactics in the 20th century in his conquest of the Nationalists in China in order for the Communists to ascend to power and also external to China, particularly in Korea against MacArthur and the United Nations troops.
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This is further substantiated by the work of Kuo Hua-Jo, whose name is practically unknown in the West. In 1939 Kuo completed an analytical commentary on “The Thirteen Chapters” entitled, “A Preliminary study of Sun Tzu’s Art of War (Sun Tzu Ping Fa Ch’u Pu Yen Chiu)”. This was designed to be used as a military textbook by the Communists. The position Kuo has now enjoyed as a leading military theoretician seems to date from that period.
General Vo Nguyen Giap, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz
General Giap has long been recognised as one of the military geniuses of modern times and his success in Vietnam echoes these sentiments. Given the success of the guerrilla struggle, it is important to note that Giap’s writings on his experiences are considered to be some of the best on a People’s War. Giap’s story is the epic story of how a small backward peasant people fought to a standstill, within less than one generation, three of the most powerful military machines of the twentieth century - those of Japan, of colonial France, and of the United States. This is a demonstration of how in Vietnam it has been possible to defeat material force with moral force, defeat what is strong with what is weak, defeat what is modern with what is primitive.(66)
A major theme of Giap’s thesis is the 2,000 year history of Vietnamese resistance to foreign aggression. Giap terms the struggle a just war of national liberation fought by a small country against a powerful aggressor, but he regards international conditions as extremely favourable to his people’s struggle. He refers to accept aid from the socialist countries as a crucial ingredient in the war. The strength of the enemy and the size of Vietnam conditional on General Giap’s' strategy. He sees a total war, involving both political and military action, fought by the entire people, at the front and behind the lines and in all areas of Vietnam. At the same time, American firepower reinforces the need for a protracted war strategy in order to weaken America’s will to fight. The north served as a sanctuary and source of reserves for the struggle in the South.
Foreseeing a long war, Giap ensured that military action used minimal resources to inflict maximum physical and psychological damage on the enemy. Three types of troops were involved at different levels of operation: regular, regional and guerrilla forces. At all levels, surprise attack, both political and military, was an important component of General Giap’s strategy. He regards the Party and its “military line for people’s war” as the major vehicle for mobilising the people to win the war. Georges Baudarel, an authority on Vietnamese military affairs and thought, places Giap in the long line of military strategists of Vietnamese history and relates his theories of warfare to those of Lenin, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Mao Tse Tung. (67)
When the Vietnamese Liberation Army was established on-" 22 December,1944, it was only a propaganda section of thirty-four men. But within six months it had spread like water, and by June 1945 the whole northern region between Hanoi and Cao Bang had been transformed into a liberated area. The decisive struggle did not take place in the mountains, however, but in the towns. On August 19, while Giap’s men were still fighting at Thai Nguyen, an uprising led to the overthrow of the pro-Japanese government. At the time, Party Leaders explained their victory solely in terms of the thought of Lenin, Stalin, or Mao. The Vietnamese Revolution retained a distinctive identity of its own. A new experiment had just succeeded. The cities had not been encircled from the countryside; they had exploded from within, of their own accord.(68)
As the war expanded after December 1946, it revived another specifically national tradition - that of resistance. Villagers again began to make snares and dig traps.
In response to the course of French search-and-clear campaigns, certain villages spontaneously transformed themselves into fortresses by digging a whole network of tunnels.(69)
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The great wars of Vietnamese history have never really involved complicated professional manoeuvres where, to Clausewitz, “Time and chance shuffled the cards.”(70) Since the Tenth century, under a centralised government, military recruitment has been carried out under regulations that approximate conscription. Total war, which was unknown in Europe prior to 1792, has been the strategy of all great Vietnamese military leaders when confronted by an invader. They did not hesitate to appeal to the people to meet the threat with widespread guerrilla warfare, optional use of the terrain, and campaigns in which highly mobile units carried out surprise attacks on the enemy.(71)
According to Lacouture all of Vietnam’s ancient strategists had studied Sun Tzu. Without discounting his own abilities, Giap today can place his entire career in the direct line of the historic generals of his own country. He has affirmed this more clearly than ever since 1967, which should be sub-titled: “A Brief Summary of the Military art of Vietnam.”(72)
In 1965, the only superiority that the Vietnamese could claim in relation to the enemy, and thus their only source of strength, was their will to win. With their potential for resistance, they countered the might of the American military machine. The North provided the South with both logistical and operational support, but without having to commit the major part of its forces or endanger its reserves, the preservation of which is the essential condition for carrying out the protracted war. The use of the North as a great rear base area, whose purpose was to serve as a sanctuary and source of reserves throughout the hostilities, certainly accords with Giap’s statements.(73)
For Giap, this was a war of local aggression whose level of conflict was scaled to the existence of a socialist area.(74)
It was under the influence of all these factors that the theories formulated by Giap gradually took shape. Giap believed that the relationship between revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary forces should “not only be considered at the international level, but also in the context of a single sector, in the limited confines of South Vietnam.”(75) Giap’s revolutionary line is defined in terms of the smallness of the territory and its limited resources. Within that framework, military action should engage all the resources of the nation in every area and in every sphere – political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, and military. This struggle - “the combined strength of all revolutionary means” and the total war of the entire people is aimed simultaneously at military and political targets guerrilla warfare and local insurrection, in order to unleash a general insurrection. Those operations that are strictly military are to be led simultaneously by three types of forces - regular, regional, and guerrilla. They are to receive support in three levels - moral, material, and tactical - through methods designed to heighten their political consciousness, provide the necessary equipment, and improve their combat tactics.(76)
According to Lacouture, Giap’s thinking seems at first glance to be a synthesis of Lenin and Liao, of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. It is actually closer to the latter two than to the former two. Giap conceives guerrilla warfare - the jewel in Sun Tzu’s crown - as an essential condition for revolutionary war.(77) Giap conceives of the process of guerrilla war as complex in which both the legal and the illegal struggle within the existing political structure have important roles to play in the revolution. Although Giap never stated the paradox openly, his reasoning says Lacouture, is based on a principle of the economy of means, which was concisely stated by Sun Tzu :“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Giap’s entire strategy is designed to exploit the interaction between the concentration of the enemy’s forces and the space which the revolutionary forces can move. By sending all available men into the countryside, he seals it against the enemy and extends the elusive front of guerrilla warfare in every direction. Concealing his own strengths, he marks his enemy’s weak points, and then strikes in order to slip through enemy lines. His art contains Sun Tzu’s stratagems. Yet, because this people’s war is fought against the West, it gives the impression of having assumed a more Western character. It is the “organic whole” whose “centre of gravity” Clausewitz sought to ascertain so that he could attack it with the concentrated blow of all his forces. Thus, the military line evolves as hostilities develop. “Each style of warfare,” Giap writes, “must be adapted to the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and to the strategic situation of each phase of the war.”(78) In the final analysis politics remains the ultimate objective and the key to all action, because “the strength of the revolutionary war is the centralised manifestation of the all out strength of the revolution.”(79)
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Giap’s strategy was protracted war, which was designed to counter the deployment of the American military machine in a country whose resources were limited. The counter offensive phase becomes a general insurrection with simultaneous political and military action. Attacks on the enemy’s base area take precedence and, in a sense, the enemy’s rear becomes the main front. Giap’s formula of the three strategic sectors, the front is everywhere at once, in the mountainous areas as well as in rural areas (plains and river delta) and the towns. Giap considers all three strategic sectors to be of equal importance and also acknowledges that it is possible to win battles in a relatively short time by taking advantages of all favourable conditions.(80)
In the final analysis, people’s war, as Giap conceives of it, is a war prolonged by the maximum economy of forces. In conducting people’s war the aim is to gain time. It follows that every operation must produce an increase in strength. According to that theory, the extension of war in time is obtained by the brevity of military actions and by limitations on the number of troops participating in attacks on points selected for their shock value. Although total war is of a highly technical nature it remains a people’s war; although it requires the general and diversified participation of the population, that is not its sole prerequisite.
Thus as can be seen from the evidence presented, Giap like Mao was a keen student of Sun Tzu and put into practice many of his strategies.
In addition there is a strong Clausewitz flavour to his strategies, and so it seems that Giap’s thinking is a synthesis of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.
Comparisons and Contrasts
Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have different ideas on the tactic of cutting the enemy’s line of retreat. “To a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape... Create in his mind that there is an alternative to death - then strike”,(81) says Sun Tzu. Preventing an enemy returning homewards, or pressing an enemy at bay will prove too costly: cornered- troops, he observes, will fight to the death.
Clausewitz states: “In strategy .....the side that is surrounded is better off than the side which surrounds its opponent”.(82) He advocates the complete encirclement of parts of the enemy from a tactical viewpoint, but acknowledges the dangers in totally surrounding the enemy.
The value and the power of defensive strategies is acknowledged by both exponents. Defensive war is waged for “our independence”(83) says Clausewitz; Sun Tzu states, it is the foundation stone of ’invincibility’.(84) It is easier to defend ground than to take it. It is the stronger form of war than the attack. Defensive strategies can be readily turned to one’s advantage. Sun Tzu indicates that those who are expert in the arts of concealment and attack”... are capable of both protecting them and of gaining complete victory.”(85) Even withdrawals are designed to entice the enemy and make him vulnerable to counterattack.(86)
Similarly, for Clausewitz, defensive strategies consist of finding the right balance between “waiting and parrying.” For him too, the act of withdrawal works to his advantage by increasing the range of environmental, political, and human resources at his disposal.(87)
The authors differ in the significance they place on the numerical superiority of their armies. 'Whilst acknowledging the importance of the skill levels of commanders, and the training and morale of the troops, Clausewitz holds that whilst there might be exceptions, “...sooner —” or later numbers will always tell.”(88) For Sun Tzu, vulnerability is not measured solely in physical terms: the personal qualities of the opposing commander, the calibre and loyalty of his troops, and the physical condition and situation of his forces, all constitute factors upon
which he can devise an advantageous course of action.(89)
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Although Sun Tzu appears to undertake a more humane and less destructive approach to war, he nevertheless expects his commanders to be no less ruthless than does Clausewitz, once engaged in the heat of battle. Where Clausewitz talks of generals needing to show a “severity bordering on cruelty”(90) and leading with a “tyrannical authority” that “...demands of their troops the most extreme exertions and the greatest privations…”,(91) Sun Tzu sees it necessary to sometimes deny his own troops an avenue of retreat; to use them to gain advantage without revealing the dangers involved; and to throw them into a “perilous situation” or put them in “death ground”. “When the army is placed in such a situation”, he writes, “ it can snatch victory from defeat.”(92)
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu share similar views about the relationship between the military and the State. Clausewitz repeatedly asserts that military and political strategy must go hand in hand: “war”, he(93) insists, is “nothing but the continuation of policy with other means,” therefore the political leadership should ultimately control and direct the conduct of war.(94) Sun Tzu agrees with this: “In general”, he writes, “the system of employing troops is that the commander receives his mandate from the sovereign to mobilise the people and assemble the army”(95) and further, “…enlightened rulers deliberate upon the plans and good generals execute them”.(96) There is, however, a degree of flexibility here: “There are occasions when the commands of the sovereign need not be obeyed”;(97) and, perhaps, a touch of ambivalence - one of the predictors of success, writes Sun Tzu, is the “...employment of generals who are able and who are not interfered with by the sovereign.”(98)
For both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz the primary objective of war is victory, but, as has been demonstrated, by their different positions and modern times in practice by both Mao Tse Tung, & Giap, the means they employ are vastly different. Clausewitz advocates brute force whereas Sun Tzu employs finesse in the art of war.
Notes
S.B. Griffin, Sun Tzu — The Art of War, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1971, PV
ibid*, p. V
ibid., p. VI
ibid., p.V1
Michael Howard, Clausewitz, Oxford University Press, Guernsey, 1983, p. 2
C. Von Clausewita, On War, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1984, p. 144
U.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, Cambridge University Press London, 1978, P49
ibid., p.50
ibid., p. 50
C. Von Clausewitz, On $ar, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1984, p 21
P. Paret, (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy : from Machiavelli to the Unclear Age, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p 199
C. Von Clausewits, Principles of War, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, I960, p 45
ibid., p. 45
ibid., p. 46
ibid., p. 47
ibid., p. 47
ibid., p.45
M. Howard Clausewitz, Oxford University Press, Hew York, 1983, p.42
ibid., p.57
Clausewitz, 1960, op. cit., p.50
ibid., p. 50
Paret, op. cit., p. 199
Howard, op. cit., p. 39
ibid. p. 42
ibid., p. 44
ibid., p. 46
ibid., p. 24-25
S. B. Griffith, Sun Tzu : The Art of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 1971, p 77 .
ibid., p. 77
ibid., pp. 78-79
ibid., p. 75
ibid., p. 41
ibid*, p. 59
ibid., p. 40
ibid., p. 65
ibid., p. 65
ibid., p. 66
ibid., pp 66-67
ibid., pp. 67-69
ibid., p. 84
ibid., p. 148
ibid., p. 148
ibid., p. 100
ibid., p. 101
R.B. Asprey, “Guerrilla Warfare”, Encyclopaedia Brittanica, (15th ed.) Vol 8, 1982, pp. 460-461
Griffith, op. cit., p. 101
ibid., p. 134
ibid., p 87
S.B. Griffith, Sun Tzu : The Art of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 1971, p.45
ibid., pp. 45-46
ibid., p. 46
ibid., p. 46
ibid., p. 46
ibid., p. 47
Griffith, op. cit., p. 51
Griffith, op. cit., p. 51
ibid., p. 51
ibid., p. 51
Griffith, op. cit., pp. 51-52
ibid., p. 52
Griffith, op. cit., p. 52
Griffith, op, cit., p. 55
Griffith, op. cit., pp. 55-54
Griffith, op. cit., pp. 54
ibid., pp. 54-55
General Vo Nguyen Giap, The Military Art of People’s War, Modem Header, New York, 1971 Press Review, Back Page.
General Vo Hjiayen Giap, Banner of People’s far, The Party’s Military Line, Pall Mall Press, London, 1970, Preface by Jean Lacouture.
ibid., p. xii
ibid., p. xii
Lacouture, op. cit., p xiii
ibid., p. xiii
ibid., p. xvi
ibid., p. xvi
ibid., p xvii
ibid., p. xvii
ibid., p. xvii
ibid., pp. xvii-xviii
ibid., p. 89
ibid., p. 26
ibid., p. 68
Griffith, op. cit., pp. 109-110
Clausewits, I960, op. cit., p. 49
ibid., p. 55
Griffith, op. cit., p. 85
ibid., p. 85
ibid., p. 41
Howard, op. cit., p 56
ibid., p 47
Griffith, op. cit., p. 42
Clausewits, 1960, op. cit., p. 65
ibid., p. 67
Griffith, op. cit., p. 159
Howard, op. cit., p. 54
Paret, op, cit., p. 200
Griffith, op, cit., p. 111
ibid., p. 142
ibid., p. 111
ibid., p. 85
Bibliography
Asprey, R.B., 'G-uerrilla Warfare”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, (15 ecL) Vol, 8, 1982 pp 458-464.
Clausewitz, C. von, Principles of War, Stackpole Books, Harrisbuig, I960.
Clausewitz, C. von, On War, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1984.
Giap, Vo Nguyen, Banner of People*s War, The Party’s Military Line, Pall Mall Press, London, 1970.
Giap, Vo N uyen, The Military Art of People’s War, Modem Reader, New fork, 1971.
Griffith, S.B., Sun Tzu: The Art of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 1971
Howard, M., Clausewitz, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
Paret, P, (ed.), Makers of Modem Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
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